Loyola of Los Angeles International
and Comparative Law Review
Volume 34
Number 2 Fall 2011

Article 2

9-1-2011

The ACTA Boondoggle: When IP Harmonization Bites Off More
Than It Can Chew
Daniel Lifschitz
Loyola Law School Los Angeles

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Daniel Lifschitz, The ACTA Boondoggle: When IP Harmonization Bites Off More Than It Can Chew, 34 Loy.
L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 197 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol34/iss2/2

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

The ACTA Boondoggle:
When IP Harmonization Bites Off
More Than It Can Chew
DANIEL LIFSCHITZ∗
Trade agreements are not terribly useful if other countries don't sign
them. I can write up the "Harold Feld Trade Agreement" that says I
am entitled to duty free liquor whenever I travel, but if no one signs
it I'm still gonna pay VAT when I do the Whisky Trail. So when
USTR and the other trade associations involved in negotiating
ACTA let Hollywood drive the crazy train, and the rest of the world
decides they don't like the crazy stuff, you don't have a trade
1
agreement, you have a train wreck.
Harold Feld
Legal Director, Public Knowledge

The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is an effort
spearheaded by the United States and other developed nations to
strengthen international protection of intellectual property (IP) rights,
intended to supplement existing treaties such as the Berne Convention,
the Paris Convention, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).2 ACTA members and supporters
have promoted it as a multilateral treaty or agreement, though this claim

∗ J.D., Loyola Law School, 2012; B.A., Washington & Jefferson College, 2009. The author
would like to thank Professor Karl Manheim for his assistance in formulating this note, Professor
Jay Dougherty for stoking the author's interest in international intellectual property law, and the
dedicated staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review for their
tireless efforts and helpful feedback during the editing process.
1. Harold Feld, ACTA: If You Write a Trade Agreement No One Will Sign, What's the
Point?, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/acta-if-youwrite-trade-agreement-no-one-will.
2. SHAYERAH ILIAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41107, THE PROPOSED ANTICOUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT: BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 1 (Mar. 12, 2010),
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41107_20100312.pdf.

197

198

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 34:197

has been subject to debate.3 The drafters of ACTA claim the agreement
is critical both to “harmonize” national IP laws and to bridge the gap
between current and necessary standards of international IP protection:
[T]he proliferation of counterfeit and pirated goods as well as the
proliferation of services that distribute infringing material,
undermines legitimate trade and the sustainable development of the
world economy, causes significant financial losses for right holders
and for legitimate businesses, and in some cases, provides a source
of revenue for organized crime and otherwise poses risks to the
4
public.

With this in mind, ACTA seeks to “provide effective and
appropriate means, complementing the TRIPS Agreement, for the
enforcement of intellectual property rights.”5 The exact nature of those
means fluctuated from draft to draft,6 but the finalized version is to be
overseen by the “ACTA Committee,” a new international body created
solely to enforce the agreement.7 The new body is independent of
existing institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the United
Nations.8 This article explores whether ACTA’s particular brand of IP
“harmonization” is necessary (or even desirable) and, if so, whether
upending existing legal regimes is the best way to accomplish it, in light
of its recent public vilification.
Due to the combination of ACTA’s protectionist measures (which
the preamble of the agreement tacitly admits will go beyond the
3. Supporters of ACTA have claimed it requires no legislative referendum and may be
adopted through the powers of the executive branch. See Andrew Moshirnia, Let’s Make A Deal!
Will ACTA Force an End to Executive Agreements?, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT (Feb. 9.
2010), available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2010/lets-make-deal-will-acta-force-endexecutive-agreements. Detractors, meanwhile, have noted that since it deals with intellectual
property law [which, in the United States, is supposed to be within the exclusive control of the
legislature], it must be a treaty, or it is otherwise unconstitutional. See Letter from Brook Baker et
al., 75 Law Professors, to Pres. Barack Obama (Oct. 28, 2010) [hereinafter PIJIP Letter],
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/academic-sign-on-letter-to-obamaon-acta. For the purposes of this article, whenever the term “treaty” or “agreement” is used to
describe ACTA, it is done without regard for the substantive constitutional ramifications of each
classification.
4. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (May 2011 Draft) Preamble E-1 [hereinafter
ACTA
(May
2011
Draft)],
available
at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147937.pdf.
5. Id.
6. Rashmi Rangnath, USTR Releases Finalized ACTA Text: Concerns Remain, PUB.
KNOWLEDGE (Nov. 15, 2010, 10:41 PM), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/ustr-releasesfinalized-acta-text-concerns-re.
7. ACTA (May 2011 Draft), supra note 4, art. 36.
8. Id. ch. V, arts. 36–38.
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requirements of TRIPS),9 its forum-avoidant negotiations, and its
establishment of the ACTA Committee, ACTA has been criticized as
being part of what some have termed the “global IP ratchet”—a
concerted, long-term effort by IP maximalists to leverage increased
protectionism through successive rounds of strong-armed international
policy making and forum-shifting.10 The ratchet theory traces back to
the 1980’s, when the United States shifted the subject of IP protection
from WIPO (a trade-neutral forum where it lacked leverage) to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (a trade-focused
forum where it had leverage) in order to increase the amount of
protection it could procure from developing countries participating in
the relevant negotiations.11 Since then,
[t]hose who seek to ration access to IP [have been] engaged in an
elaborate cat and mouse game with those who seek to expand access.
As soon as one venue becomes less responsive to a high protectionist
agenda, IP protectionists shift to another in search of a more
12
hospitable venue.

While the ratchet theory provides an interesting (if unscrupulous)
model for understanding the recent efforts of IP maximalists on the
global stage, it also creates fertile ground to examine the collateral
damage caused by their tactics—specifically, the delegitimizing of
“harmonization” as both a balanced and politically viable legal
construct going forward.
By attempting to use harmonization as a blunt instrument to beat
heightened and often inapposite IP standards into legal regimes without
overt legislative approval or meaningful public input, ACTA diminishes
respect for both intellectual property law and for international
harmonization efforts in general. This long-term sacrifice for attempted
short-term gain (ratcheting up IP protection another notch) contravenes
the core purpose of harmonization, which is to bring nations to
meaningful consensus on issues of international importance,13 and
reveals the true intent of ACTA: to forge protectionist policies amongst
9. Id. pmbl. (“Intending to provide effective and appropriate means, complementing the
TRIPS Agreement, for the enforcement of intellectual property rights . . .”) [emphasis in
original].
10. See generally, Susan Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and
Piracy Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play, 1 IQSENSATO OCCASIONAL PAPERS (2008),
available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=
research.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id. at 5.
13. The Wittem Project: European Copyright Code, WITTEM GROUP (Apr. 2010),
http://www.copyrightcode.eu/Wittem_European_copyright_code_21%20april%202010.pdf.
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a “select group of like-minded countries,”14 then foist them on “thirdnations such as China, Russia, and Brazil”15 that developed nations
perceive to have unreasonably lax standards of IP protection. Unless
civil states and citizens’ groups stand up to oppose this conflation of
methods and goals, “harmonization” will become synonymous with
“backroom deal,” and it will prove increasingly difficult to utilize any
balanced form of the construct without immediate skepticism and
distrust from both foreign governments and the public at large.
This article’s purpose is to examine the history and goals of ACTA
in order to understand both how and why it abuses the harmonization
construct. Part I will briefly discuss the modern history of IP
harmonization leading up to the conception of ACTA. Part II will detail
the basic content and secretive drafting of ACTA, contrasting both to
the ideals of harmonization. Part III will step back to examine the
rhetoric surrounding protection of IP to better understand how ACTA’s
namesake is not congruent with its provisions. Part IV will examine
ACTA’s potential to prematurely lock in developing areas of IP law as
an example of harmonization abuse. Part V will examine the problems
that have arisen in the negotiation rounds to further demonstrate
ACTA’s disinterest in meaningful harmonization. Part VI will examine
the true goal of ACTA and its likelihood of successful imposition
amongst developing countries in particular. Part VII will briefly look
beyond ACTA to determine how similar IP-ratcheting efforts conceived
in its wake have retroactively affected its viability. Finally, Part VIII
will conclude by looking at the state of IP harmonization in the
aggregate, evaluating ACTA’s place (or lack thereof) within it, and
suggesting what should be done moving forward.
I. THE DELICATE ISSUE OF IP HARMONIZATION
IP is, at its core, an artificial monopoly on certain goods in the
marketplace, granted to rights owners by governments.16 How a
14. Viewing Cable 06TOKYO3567, Japan Backs Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
Proposal, WIKILEAKS (Aug. 30, 2011), http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/06/06TOKYO3567.html
[hereinafter Tokyo Cable 1] (June 28, 2006 diplomatic cable VZCZCXRO2649 from the
American Embassy in Tokyo to Washington, D.C.).
15. Viewing Cable 06TOKYO4025, PM Koizumi’s Advisor Proposes Bilateral IPR Agenda,
WIKILEAKS (Aug. 30, 2011), http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/07/06TOKYO4025.html [hereinafter
Tokyo Cable 2] (July 20, 2006 diplomatic cable VZCZCXRO5711 from the American Embassy
in Tokyo to Washington, D.C.).
16. See Lucy Montgomery & Jason Potts, Global Reuse and Adaptation in the Creative
Industries - Three Further Arguments Against Intellectual Property Based on Lessons From
China 6, DIME Working Papers on Intellectual Property Rights, DIME Working Pack ‘The
Rules, Norms and Standards on Knowledge Exchange,’ Working Paper No. 59, Apr. 2008,
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government chooses to protect this property is heavily dependent on the
relative values of its society, which explains the variety of approaches
practiced by different countries with any given branch of IP.17 A typical
example in the context of copyright law is the “moral rights” doctrine,
which is addressed in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention (one of the
first major international treaties attempting to harmonize IP laws
between various countries).18 Under the provision, an author has the
right “to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or
other derogatory action in relation to his work . . . prejudicial to [his]
honor or reputation,” even if he has divested his economic rights to said
work.19 While both France and the United States are signatories to
Berne, in practice, Article 6bis is largely made to conform to each
country’s cultural values rather than the other way around.20 As such,
France provides full protection for an author’s moral rights (in line with
a cultural history of indelibly linking creative work to the self),21 while
the United States allows for full divestment of such rights (in line with a
historical view of IP as fully alienable in the same manner as traditional
chattel).22 Though moral rights are not brought up in the text of ACTA,
they are helpful in illustrating the substantive differences that can arise
in the context of trying to harmonize IP laws internationally, and the
fluidity required for those efforts to effectively conform to cultural
contours.23
The international harmonization of IP laws can be traced back
well over a century to the Paris Convention in 1883 (dealing with
“industrial property” such as patents and trademarks),24 and the Berne

available at http://www.dime-eu.org/files/active/0/WP59-IPR.pdf (describing IP as “an artificial
monopoly to enable producers of ideas to capture monopoly rents that at least cover their fixed
costs of production.”).
17. See Peter K. Yu, Four Common Misconceptions About Copyright Piracy, 26 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 127, 132 (2003) (discussing the impact of culture on the inculcation and
development of copyright laws).
18. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention], available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html.
19. Id.
20. Compare infra notes 21, 22.
21. CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C. PRO. INTELL.] arts. L-121-1 to L-121-8
(Fr.) available at http://www.celog.fr/cpi/lv1_tt2.htm.
22. Upon accession to Berne, the United States Congress claimed that its “moral rights”
provisions were sufficiently addressed by existing domestic statutes, such as laws covering libel
and false designation of origin. See S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 9 (1988).
23. See generally S. REP. NO. 100-352 (1988).
24. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, available
at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/pdf/trtdocs_wo020.pdf.
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Convention in 1886 (dealing with copyrights).25 Discussing the impact
of the Paris Convention in particular, Cícero Gontijo has credited the
longevity of these early treaties to the fact that they “did not try to level
national laws,” but rather “stipulated a vast legislative freedom for each
country and only required the equal treatment of nationals and
foreigners (national treatment principle).”26 The administrative
secretariats of Paris and Berne merged in 1893 to form the United
International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property, which
relocated to Geneva in 1960 and was succeeded in 1967 by WIPO.27
WIPO currently administers twenty-four different treaties concerning
various IP issues.28 Though WIPO’s guiding principle is “to promote the
protection of intellectual property throughout the world” [emphasis
added],29 it allows individual countries to mix and match the treaties
acceded to,30 striking a pragmatic and diplomatic balance between
effective harmonization and respecting both the self-determination and
cultural nuances of its various member states.
Over the past two decades, however, WIPO has been slowly
marginalized by developed countries dissatisfied by the deferential and
bureaucratic nature of the WIPO process, which limited their ability to
impose (rather than propose) strengthened IP protections.31 Those
countries, in turn, began a forum-shifting process to move the protection
of IP into a trade-driven context, where it would be easier to leverage

25. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html.
26. Cícero Gontijo, Changing the Patent System from the Paris Convention to the TRIPS
Agreement: The Position of Brazil GLOBAL ISSUE PAPERS NO. 26, 7 (Andrea Carina Ceschi,
trans.,
Heinrich
Böll
Foundation,
Dec.
2005),
http://fdclberlin.de/fileadmin/fdcl/Publikationen/GIP_Gontijo-Patente.pdf.
27. See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization arts. 2–3, July
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (as amended Sept. 28, 1979) [hereinafter Convention
Establishing WIPO], available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=130331.
28. See
WIPO-Administered
Treaties,
WORLD
INTELL.
PROP.
ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ (last visited July 11, 2012).
29. Convention Establishing WIPO, supra note 27, art. 3(i).
30. Admission
Criteria
of
WIPO,
WORLD
INTELL.
PROP.
ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/members/en/ (last visited July 11, 2012). A country may join WIPO by
invitation or by membership to any one of a number of organizations or conventions.
31. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L. L. 20 (2004) (“Two factors
motivated the United States and the EC, in response to pressures from their respective intellectual
property industries, to shift intellectual property lawmaking from WIPO to GATT. The first
related to dissatisfaction with treaty negotiations hosted by WIPO. The second focused on
institutional features of the GATT that facilitated adoption of more stringent intellectual property
protection standards that these states favored.”).
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higher levels of protection.32 This began with the inclusion of IP issues
in the 1986 mandate for the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations,
leading to the creation of the WTO.33 From there, the passage of TRIPS
in 1994 superseded a slew of WIPO treaties (many incorporated by
mention)34 by setting minimum requirements for signatory nations’
domestic laws concerning copyright, trademark, and patent law—all
congruent with harmonization efforts, but administered by the WTO
instead of WIPO.35 All nations wishing to join the WTO were and are
required to accede to TRIPS, with very little flexibility in the process.36
Essentially, any WTO nation that lagged on acceding to the
protectionist treaties of WIPO was yanked up to speed by TRIPS.37
The forum-shift from WIPO to the WTO is reflective of a similar
shift in the overall tone of IP harmonization, one favoring increased
uniformity and greater deference to industrialized countries (through
strengthened IP protections) over cultural nuance and minimalism.38
According to economic scholars Braithwaite and Drahos, the United
States and other developed countries were instrumental to the lobbying
effort that passed TRIPS, in particular by coercing less-developed
countries under Section 301 of TRIPS.39 Section 301 authorizes the
United States to respond to any perceived denial of rights or benefits
32. Id. at 22 (“Developing nations agreed to include intellectual property within the newly
created WTO in exchange for securing access to the markets of industrialized states for their
agricultural products, textiles, and other goods.”).
33. Id. at 21.
34. BRAITHWAITE AND DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 63 (Cambridge
University Press, 2000) (“TRIPS incorporates various other intellectual property conventions by
reference.”)
35. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 300 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
36. Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS in the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm (last visited July 11, 2012) (“All the
WTO agreements . . . apply to all WTO members. The members each accepted all the agreements
as a single package with a single signature—making it, in the jargon, a ‘single undertaking.’ The
TRIPS Agreement is part of that package. Therefore it applies to all WTO members.”)
37. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 34, at 63 (“The post-TRIPS era has been one in
which countries have had to engage in national implementation of their obligations under TRIPS.
Least-developed countries have the advantage of a ten-year transitional period under the
agreement, but they have been pressured by developed countries, particularly the US, to move
sooner rather than later on its implementation.”).
38. Id. at 63 (“In the past, states have been able to steer their way through the international
intellectual property framework by taking reservation on clauses in treaties or by not ratifying
certain protocols or conventions. All of TRIPS is binding on all members of the WTO.”).
39. Id. (“Once the US had persuaded a sufficient number of countries to act on the
intellectual property issue at a bilateral level, it could expect little resistance to the TRIPS
proposal (in fact resistance to US negotiating objectives at a multilateral forum could and did
trigger the 301 process).”).
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under a trade agreement by taking action against the offending nation
“to enforce such rights or to obtain the elimination of such act, policy,
or practice.”40 Arguably, the WTO’s dispute resolution process has
replaced Section 301 as the de facto response to perceived IP disrespect
by foreign countries, but both methods retain the same overall message:
softness on IP protection will not be taken lightly.
Section 301(c) outlines the various sanctions at the Office of the
United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) disposal when dealing
with a foreign country’s perceived prejudicing of U.S. interests,41 and
Section 301(d)(3)(B) includes failure to protect IP rights as an example
of the sort of unreasonable act that could provoke this retaliation.42 As
Braithwaite and Drahos note, “[Using Section 301] proved so effective
that disputes over intellectual property issues during the Uruguay Round
became disputes between the intellectual property triumvirate, the US,
Europe and Japan. By the final stages of the negotiations, developing
countries had long given up resisting the TRIPS proposal.”43
At this point in the negotiation process, harmonization began to
look a lot more like coercion than cooperation. Where WIPO fostered a
sense of deference and cultural respect between member nations, TRIPS
took a blunter approach by essentially barring access to the WTO’s
various international markets until a country ratcheted up its IP laws to
acceptable levels.44 This brought Berne-resistant states such as Russia
and China to the table,45 but undermined the efficacy of WIPO and the
overall sense that IP rights enforcement was up for legitimate debate.46
Furthermore, by moving it into a strictly trade-driven context, TRIPS
began a trend of downplaying the uniquely human elements of IP while
forging international agreements, one that has arguably had drastic
ramifications for both current and future harmonization efforts.47
As a study in contrasts, it is worth mentioning two particular
WIPO treaties passed in the immediate post-TRIPS period: the WIPO
40. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (2010).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 2411(d)(3)(B).
43. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 34, at 63.
44. Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS in the WTO, supra note 36.
45. Compare Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, available
at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/pdf/berne.pdf (accession dates of states) with
Members
and
Observers,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2011)
(China acceded to Berne two weeks before signing to TRIPS, while Russia joined Berne three
months after adapting TRIPS).
46. Helfer, supra note 31, at 4–7.
47. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 35, § 3.
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Performances and Phonograms Treaty and the WIPO Copyright Treaty.
Finalized in 1996, “[t]he negotiating history of these two treaties is
significant in that copyright owners met with organized resistance from
copyright users”48 as enabled by the forum. The result of this clash of
interests was, ultimately, a more balanced treaty that represented the
rights of both owners and users.49 TRIPS, on the other hand, was drafted
almost entirely with copyright owners’ interests in mind, leading to an
outcry from developing nations over the narrow readings of its
provisions on which the developed members of the WTO insisted.50
It is in light of this particular history of harmonization that ACTA
must be understood. TRIPS was the developed world’s answer to the
“failure” of WIPO to achieve a particular desired level of
harmonization, implementing in one fell swoop what the latter did not
achieve in decades of operating under balancing protocols that
permitted selective adoption of treaties by members.51 The efficacy of
this maneuver marked a fundamental shift in the tone of harmonization,
where the end goal was no longer to balance IP for its own sake, but to
drive it in a particular, uniform direction to service exterior concerns.52
By using the GATT to frame IP as a trade issue, TRIPS justified
shifting the debate from WIPO to the WTO, where developed countries
could draft harmonization provisions with less pressure from consumer
advocacy groups or developing nations.53 Harmonization as a trade
method became distinct from harmonization as a legal method, and the
WTO was almost exclusively concerned with servicing the former.54
ACTA represents the latest iteration of this trend, having shifted
somewhat from a trade concern to a security and infringement-based
concern. Though its preamble does discuss some trade concerns
outright,55 much of the language of ACTA is dressed up with security

48. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 37, at 64.
49. Id. (“The Copyright Treaty grants copyright owners a right of communication to the
public, but recognizes the right of states to determine the extent of the copyright owner’s right of
distribution.”).
50. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf
(reaffirming
flexibility of TRIPS member states in circumventing patent rights for better access to essential
medicines).
51. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 37, at 63, 67.
52. See id. at 63–64.
53. Helfer, supra note 31, at 19, 22.
54. See id. at 23–24.
55. ACTA (May 2011 Draft), supra note 4, pmbl. (“[T]he proliferation of counterfeit and
pirated goods as well as the proliferation of services that distribute infringing material,
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rhetoric, including allegations that piracy “provides a source of revenue
for organized crime and otherwise poses risk to the public.”56 ACTA’s
very name (“Anti-Counterfeiting . . . ”) evokes trademark law, the
primary purpose of which is to protect the public, even though
trademark is only one of the fields of IP implicated by the agreement.57
On its own, this rhetorical shift is not overly disconcerting. The
procedural posture of ACTA, however, is rife with troubling
differentiations from the agreements preceding it. While TRIPS was
openly negotiated, ACTA was drafted almost entirely behind closed
doors with select stakeholders.58 TRIPS brought its debate to a known
entity (the WTO), whereas ACTA seeks to take development and
enforcement matters into its own hands.59 Finally, while WIPO has
maintained a modicum of civility with the WTO,60 WIPO’s Director
General has not minced words on what a “bad development” ACTA’s
implementation would be for the current multilateral system.61
II. THE INCEPTION, EVOLUTION, AND OBFUSCATION OF ACTA
To better understand the concerns stemming from ACTA, the
background of the agreement must be examined. ACTA was primarily
conceived in 2006 by the United States and Japan “to bring together
those countries, both developed and developing, that are interested in
fighting counterfeiting and piracy, and to negotiate an agreement that
enhances international cooperation and contains effective international
standards for enforcing intellectual property rights.”62 Japan previously
floated the idea of a new IP enforcement treaty at the Global Congress
on Combating Counterfeiting (GCCC), and the Congress seized upon it
in the 2005 Lyon Declaration and its 2006 follow-up.63 The number of
undermines legitimate trade and the sustainable development of the world economy, causes
significant financial losses for right holders and for legitimate businesses . . . ”).
56. Id.
57. See infra Part III.
58. See infra Part II.
59. ACTA (May 2011 Draft), supra note 4, ch. 5.
60. See WTO-WIPO Cooperation Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Dec. 22,
1995), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtowip_e.htm.
61. Catherine Saez, ACTA a Sign Of Weakness in Multilateral System, WIPO Head Says,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 30, 2010, 6:18 PM), http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/2010/06/30/acta-a-sign-of-weakness-in-multilateral-systemwipo-head-says.
62. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement - Summary of Key Elements Under
Discussion, FOREIGN AFF. & INT’L TRADE CANADA, http://www.international.gc.ca/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/fo/key-summary-resume-cle.aspx?lang=en (last updated July
18, 2011) [hereinafter ACTA Summary].
63. SECOND GLOBAL CONGRESS ON COMBATING COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY, THE
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countries involved in the proceedings slowly increased, with Canada,
the European Union (EU), and Switzerland joining preliminary talks
throughout 2006 and 2007.64 Official negotiations over ACTA began in
June of 2008, attaching Australia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand,
South Korea and Singapore as well.65 According to reports, the October
2010 Tokyo round of negotiations brought the participating countries to
“agreement in principle.”66 One last round of talks (described as a “legal
scrub”) took place in Sydney, Australia in early 2011.67
Under its provisions, ACTA would establish a new international
legal framework with its own governing body, eschewing existing
international institutions such as WIPO and the WTO.68 While the
European Commission has stated that ACTA “will be consistent with
the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS Agreement) and will respect the Declaration on TRIPS
and Public Health,”69 others have claimed that it will likely be construed
to go far beyond TRIPS,70 with its “ultimate objective” admittedly being
to coerce large emerging economies, “where IPR enforcement could be
improved, such as China, Russia or Brazil, . . . [to] sign up to the global
pact.”71
The final consolidated text of ACTA contains a total of six
chapters, themselves containing a total of 45 articles.72 Chapter I covers
initial provisions and definitions,73 integrating portions of TRIPS by
reference.74 Chapter II provides the basic legal framework to be
followed by the signatories, itself split into four subsections, the four
subsections preceded by a preamble of general obligations:75 Section 1
LYON DECLARATION 1, 4, (Nov. 15, 2005) [hereinafter LYON DECLARATION], available at
http://www.ccapcongress.net/archives/Lyon/files/OutcomesStatement20051115.pdf.
64. ACTA Summary, supra note 62.
65. EU, US and Others Hold Geneva Talks on Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement,
EUR. COMMISSION (Jun. 5, 2008), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/june/tradoc_139086
.pdf.
66. Elaine Lies et al., Countries Reach Tentative Anti-Counterfeiting Pact, REUTERS, Oct. 2,
2010,
available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/02/us-trade-counterfeitingidUSTRE6910AO20101002.
67. IP POL’Y COMMITTEE BLOG (Nov. 8, 2010), http://tacd-ip.org/archives/270.
68. ACTA (May 2011 Draft), supra note 4, ch. V.
69. ACTA Summary, supra note 62, at 2.
70. Jonathan Lynn, States Clash over Anti-Counterfeiting Enforcement, REUTERS (Jun. 9,
2010), http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49179920100609.
71. ACTA Fact Sheet (March 2010), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/acta-fact-sheet-march-2010 [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
72. ACTA (May 2011 Draft), supra note 4, arts. 1.1–1.X.
73. Id. ch. I.
74. Id. art. 1, n.4.
75. Id. ch. II, art. 2.X.
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(in which patents and trade secrets are optional) covers civil
enforcement, including damage awards and injunctive relief;76 Section 2
(which does not cover patents by party agreement)77 deals with border
measures and suggests (but does not require) de minimis exceptions for
personal affects (e.g., imported goods for personal use);78 Section 3
covers criminal enforcement standards;79 and Section 4 covers digital
enforcement (including anti-circumvention provisions).80
After establishing the bulk of its substance in the first two
chapters, ACTA moves on to more ministerial issues. Chapter III urges
transparency, public consultation, and public awareness, but only
insofar as it communicates the need for protecting IP and educating on
the available methods for doing so.81 Chapter IV lays the groundwork
for international cooperative efforts in enforcing the agreement.82 And
while Chapters V and VI of ACTA provide the possibility for
subsequent amendments to the agreement,83 it does so without offering
public or judicial review of them, only extending the elective possibility
of third-party consultation.84
The closed nature of ACTA’s amendment process (which, as
previously noted, eschews public and judicial scrutiny) is consistent
with the lack of transparency that had marked the entire negotiation
process. The existence of the agreement was first brought to mainstream
public attention when a 2008 discussion paper concerning preliminary
drafting was published on the website Wikileaks.85 The website noted
that the paper had been distributed only to pro-copyright lobbyists for
comment, with consumer rights groups excluded from the discussion.86
In the wake of the leak, many such groups banded together to demand

76. Id. ch. II, § 1.
77. Id. ch. II, § 2.
78. Id.
79. Id. ch. II, § 3.
80. Id. ch. II, § 4.
81. Id. ch. III.
82. Id. ch. IV.
83. Id. chs. V–VI.
84. Id. ch. V, art. 5.5.
85. Wikileaks
Runs
ACTA
Proposal,
P2PNET
(May
24,
2008),
http://www.p2pnet.net/story/16026.
86. The
Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade
Agreement,
IP
JUST.,
available
at
http://ipjustice.org/wp/campaigns/acta/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2011) (“[A] ‘Discussion Paper on a
Possible Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’ was reportedly provided to select lobbyists in the
intellectual property industry, but not to public interest organizations concerned with the subject
matter of the proposed treaty (Wikileaks posted the leaked ACTA discussion paper on 22 May
2008).”).
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the negotiations be opened up to them,87 and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation filed a federal lawsuit to expedite the process.88 Both efforts
were summarily rebuffed by the USTR, first on the grounds that such
release could “implicate national security or expose the USTR’s
deliberative processes,”89 then by unconvincingly claiming the
documents were “classified in the interest of national security pursuant
to Executive Order 12958.”90 Efforts to obtain further information
outside the United States met similar fates: when the Foundation for a
Free Information Infrastructure filed a request to the EU Council to
release documents related to the ACTA negotiations, the Council
simply refused to do so.91
As it became apparent that any substantive information concerning
ACTA’s content was being held close to the drafters’ chests, voices of
concern began to emanate from the U.S. Congress: Senators Patrick
Leahy and Arlen Specter sent a letter to the USTR expressing worries
that ACTA “could limit Congress’s ability to make appropriate
refinements to intellectual property law in the future.”92 A subsequent
letter from Senators Bernie Sanders and Sherrod Brown, directed
towards the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), noted
that “ACTA involves dozens if not hundreds of substantive aspects of
intellectual property law and its enforcement, including those that have
87. Press Release, Essential Action, Secret Counterfeiting Treaty Public Must Be Made
Public, Global Organizations Say (Sept. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Essential Action Press Release],
available at http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Secret_Counterfeiting_Treaty_Public_Must_be_Made_Publ
ic,_Global_Organizations_Say.
88. U.S. Trade Office Withholds Documents on Secret IP Enforcement Treaty, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2008/09/17.
89. Government Blocks Release of Documents on Secret IP Enforcement Treaty,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 29, 2009), https://www.eff.org/press/archives/2009/01/29.
90. James Love, White House Says ACTA Text a State Secret. EU Parliament Says Time for
More
Transparency,
KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY
INT’L
(Mar.
12,
2009),
http://www.keionline.org/blogs/2009/03/12/acta-state-secret/ [hereinafter EU Parliament: Time
for More Transparency]. It should be noted that Executive Order 12958 allows material to be
classified only if disclosure would do “damage to the national security and the original
classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage.” See Classified National
Security Information, 60 FED. REG. 19825 (Apr. 17, 1995), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/clinton/eo12958.html. Yet the text of the FOIA request which prompted
the invocation of 12958 noted that the texts requested “are being widely circulated to corporate
lobbyists in Europe, Japan, and the U.S.” See James Love, Obama Administration Rules Texts of
New IPR Agreement Are State Secrets, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-love/obama-administration-rule_b_174450.html.
91. Ante Wessels, EU Council Refuses to Release Secret ACTA Documents, FOUND. FOR
FREE INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, http://press.ffii.org/Press_releases/EU_Council_refuses_to_releas
e_secret_ACTA_documents (last modified Aug. 15, 2009).
92. Stephanie Condon, Pro-IP Senators Concerned Anti-Counterfeiting Treaty May Be Too
Broad, CNET NEWS (Oct. 2, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10057100-38.html.
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nothing to do with counterfeiting . . . [and] the public has a right to
monitor and express informed views on proposals of such magnitude.”93
Yet another letter from Senator Ron Wyden demanded that the USTR
confirm the veracity of leaks surrounding the then-unfinished
agreement, noting that the “objectives behind [ACTA’s] negotiations
still remain inadequately clear to the American public.”94
Similar reactions could be seen across the international
community’s legislative and diplomatic bodies. The EU Parliament
voted 663 to 13 against validating ACTA, proclaiming: “This
Parliament will not sit back silently while the fundamental rights of
millions of citizens are being negotiated away behind closed doors. We
oppose any ‘legislation laundering’ on an international level of what
would be very difficult to get through most national legislatures or the
European Parliament.”95 Individual countries also balked: Brazil plainly
described ACTA as illegitimate,96 the Mexican Senate voted
unanimously to withdraw from its negotiations,97 and India voiced
serious concerns on the floor of the WTO:
While India is committed to dealing with IPR enforcement issues in
line with its TRIPS obligations, the introduction of intrusive IPR
enforcement rules in international trade does not represent a
reasonable or realistic response. Agreements such as ACTA have the
portents to completely upset the balance of rights and obligations of
the TRIPS Agreement. They could also potentially undermine
serious decisions taken multilaterally such as the Doha Declaration
on Public Health in WTO and the Development Agenda in WIPO.
An enforcement response, if required, has to emerge from a
multilateral and transparent process, as is available in the WTO
TRIPS Council, and should fully conform to the Objectives and
Principles (Art 7, 8) of TRIPS agreement and the balance of rights
98
and obligations enshrined in the Agreement.
93. James Love, Senators Sanders and Brown Ask White House to Make ACTA Text Public,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Nov. 3, 2009), http://www.keionline.org/node/698.
94. David Kravets, Senator Demands IP Treaty Details, THREAT LEVEL (Jan. 7, 2010),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/senator-demands-details/.
95. Parliament Threatens Court Action on Anti-Piracy Treaty, EURACTIV.COM (last updated
Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.euractiv.com/en/health/meps-defy-commission-internet-piracyagreement-news-326215.
96. Jamil Chad, Brasil Ataca Acordo de Ricos Contra Falsificação [Brazil Attacks Deal
Against
Aounterfeiting],
ESTADÃO
(Oct.
7,
2010),
http://www.estadao.com.br/estadaodehoje/20101007/not_imp621618,0.php.
97. What Exactly Mexican Senators Voted?, OPENACTA (Oct. 5, 2010),
http://www.openacta.org/?p=539.
98. Extracts of India’s Intervention to the WTO TRIPS Council: ACTA, KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY INT’L (Oct. 28, 2010), http://keionline.org/node/998.
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India’s multi-pronged analysis of ACTA’s disruptive potential
warrants particular attention, especially its mention of the Doha
Declaration on Public Health, as the latter is highly instructive of the
tunnel-vision developed nations often have when dealing with critical
aspects of international IP. The Doha Declaration emerged from the
WTO Ministerial Conference of 2001, proclaiming that:
The TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members
from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while
reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that
the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a
manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health
99
and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.

The provisions therein sought to ensure that developing countries
could circumvent certain international patent obligations by obtaining
compulsory licenses for essential medicines,100 as well as establish
criteria for exhaustion of IP rights concerning the same.101 In 2005,
members of the WTO pushed to directly incorporate Doha into
TRIPS.102 All the while, the United States opposed Doha, claiming there
was nothing wrong with the text of TRIPS as it stood.103 Whether a
sincere belief of its representatives at the time or not, the United States’
dismissive attitude during Doha now seems symptomatic of a pervasive
disinterest in the unpleasant ramifications of stringent IP enforcement.
It took the pressures of the international community to pass Doha,
much as it took public outcry and an unauthorized Wikileaks release to
bring ACTA to public light,104 and those in charge of ACTA have taken
on a similarly blasé attitude concerning agreement’s ability to upset
existing legal regimes and principles. Though ACTA negotiators
repeatedly insisted that passage of the agreement would not require
changes to domestic law in particular territories, commentators singled
99. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm.
100. Id. ¶ 5(b).
101. Id.
102. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005,
WT/MIN(05)/DEC
[hereinafter
Doha
Work
Programme],
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_text_e.htm#public_health.
103. Ian F. Fergusson, World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development
Agenda,
CONG.
RES.
SERVICE
(Jan.
18,
2008),
available
at
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL32060.pdf (“Before the Doha meeting, the
United States claimed that the current language in TRIPS was flexible enough to address health
emergencies, but other countries insisted on new language.”).
104. Wikileaks Runs ACTA Proposal, supra note 85.
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out many areas of apparent conflict that called into question the honesty
of that proclamation.105
In the United States, the typical response to such skepticism
proved to be an oblique “stay the course” mantra; for example, three
weeks after Senators Sanders and Brown asked USPTO Director David
Kappos to address specific concerns concerning the legality of ACTA’s
provisions, Kappos responded with a five-sentence letter that did
anything but.106 James Love put it tersely:
The November 12, 2010 Kappos letter was described by Senator
Sanders’ office as “a non-response,” and that’s polite. Senators
Sanders and Brown asked Kappos to compare the text in ACTA,
highlighting in particular the articles on damages, injunctions, other
remedies and border measures, against U.S. law, including but not
limited to one supreme court decision and several selected statutes in
the area of patents, copyrights and trademarks. The Kappos response
contained no analysis, no cites to U.S. law, no cites to the ACTA
text; only a thank you and a promise that “our USPTO issue experts
will continue to work with USTR as they finalize the results
107
achieved in Tokyo.”

While the European response to ACTA criticism proved more
open (in that actual responses were offered),108 it made the drawbacks of
keeping ACTA under lock and key even more apparent. EU
Commissioner Karel De Gucht, for example, had been the principal
authority promoting ACTA within the EU Parliament, making his
statements a key source of information for both the members of
parliament and the public at large to understand the ramifications of the
treaty.109 As a result, when he claimed that ACTA “does not oblige any
of its signatories to create new, substantive rights or to change existing
105. See, e.g., James Love, The October 2, 2010 Version of the ACTA Text, KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY INT’L (Oct. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Oct. 2, 2010 ACTA Text], available at
http://keionline.org/node/962.
106. Letter from David J. Kappos, Under Secretary and Director, U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office, to Sens. Bernard Sanders and Sherrod Brown (Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Letter from
David J. Kappos], available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/kappos_sanders_brown_acta
_12nov2010.pdf.
107. James Love, Non-Responsive Letter from David Kappos of USPTO to Senators Sanders
and Brown Regarding ACTA Consistency with US Law, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Nov. 17,
2010), available at http://keionline.org/node/1022 [hereinafter Kappos Letter to Sen. Sanders &
Brown].
108. See, e.g., Press Release, Karel De Gucht, European Commissioner for Trade,
Transparency and State of Play of the ACTA Negotiations (Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement), Speaking Points for Debate on Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),
European Parliament (Mar. 9, 2010) [hereinafter De Grucht Speaking Points], available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/83.
109. Id.
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ones,”110 it was reasonable to believe (as German MEP Daniel Caspary
did) that ACTA would be fully compliant with existing EU law.111 De
Gucht was later forced to admit, however, that the truth is far more
nuanced: “[Where] there is no EU acquis,112 i.e. penal enforcement, it is
possible that some Member States may need to adapt domestic
legislation to comply with commitments they have undertaken in the
negotiation of the ACTA section on penal enforcement.”113 Given that
criminal liability for infringement was one of the most contentious
issues underlying ACTA’s negotiations,114 this sort of hair-splitting
seemed disingenuous at best, highlighting the danger of designating the
words of a handful of ACTA spokespeople as “everything nonnegotiators needed to know” between drafting rounds.
Furthermore, the duality of ACTA’s public face (clandestine
negotiations followed by jarring public revelations) proved to be one of
its greatest weaknesses.115 As working drafts of the agreement regularly
leaked over the Internet, handlers such as De Gucht became mere
apologists for both its content and drafting methodologies, whereas if
the negotiations had been open to the public to begin with, substance
would have been the focus, with greater goodwill tempering the
discussions. Instead, however, negotiators doubled down on their
tactics, claiming the agreement had to be kept under lock and key as a
matter of principle.116 Yet diplomatic cables subsequently revealed that
110. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) Debate, 2010 O.J. 16 (Oct. 20, 2010)
[hereinafter
ACTA
Debate],
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20101020+ITEM016+DOC+XML+V0//EN (European Parliament debates).
111. Id. at 3 (German MEP Daniel Caspary stating, “I think it is a good thing that the acquis
communautaire remains unchanged”).
112. “Acquis,” short for “acquis communautaire,” refers to the accumulated body of current
EU law.
113. James Love, De Gucht Responds to MEP Françoise Castex. Says ACTA Is Binding
Agreement, Consistent with EU ‘Acquis,’ KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Feb. 7, 2011),
http://keionline.org/node/1073 [hereinafter De Grucht Response to Castex].
114. See infra Part III.
115. INST. FOR GLOBALISATION AND INT’L REGULATION ET AL., THE ANTICOUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA): AN ASSESSMENT 6 (2011) available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/download.do?language=en&file=43
731#search=%20anti-counterfeiting (“Efforts to maintain secrecy did not prevent a heated debate
on ACTA generated by leaked texts of proposals, evaluations and draft treaties and fuelled the
suspicion that ACTA would entail a significant shift in the laws of ACTA countries and go
significantly beyond the TRIPS Agreement.”).
116. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement - Summary of Key Elements Under
Discussion, FOREIGN AFF. & INT’L TRADE CANADA, http://www.international.gc.ca/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/fo/key-summary-resume-cle.aspx?lang=en (last updated July
18, 2011) (“A variety of groups have shown their interest in getting more information on the
substance of the negotiations and have requested that the draft text be disclosed. However, it is
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“[t]he level of confidentiality in these ACTA negotiations has been set
at a higher level than is customary for non-security agreements . . . it is
impossible for member states to conduct necessary consultations with
IPR stakeholders and legislatures under this level of confidentiality.”117
This revelation raised a salient question: if the opaque drafting process
of ACTA was both unusual and counterproductive (according to its own
negotiating members), why was it so insistently kept in place?
III. THE SCHISM BETWEEN “COUNTERFEITING” AND
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE
The explanation to the preceding question is two-fold, requiring
discussion of both the nature of intellectual property itself and the
nature of legislation in general. The latter issue is effectively
summarized by Kimberlee Weatherall of The Beirne School of Law:
Laws, like objects in physics, have a tendency to remain where they
are and take the application of ‘force’ to bring about change. Legal
change disrupts existing industry practice and once the prospect of
copyright or patent reform is raised it is difficult to confine the issues
118
that become ‘open for debate.’

Thus, each time IP maximalists call for greater levels of protection
through legislative channels, they are sure to be met by IP reformists
seeking to match or exceed their force—the drafting of the 1996 WIPO
treaties being a perfect example of this negation in practice.119 The
problem is that (to borrow phrasing from Susan K. Sell), IP maximalists
will often “assert their rights without recognizing their obligations”120 by
seeking to ratchet up protection of their interests without opening the
Pandora’s Box of wholesale debate, utilizing what economic and legal
pundit Michael Masnick describes as “a geopolitical game of leapfrog”:
The [IP] industry gets its diplomats to claim that a treaty is needed to
‘harmonize’ international laws on things like copyright, because one
country has less stringent laws than another. Of course, the treaty
always focuses on bringing the less stringent rules up to the level of
the nation with the more stringent rules. Then, the industry works on
accepted practice during trade negotiations among sovereign states to not share negotiating texts
with the public at large, particularly at earlier stages of the negotiation.”).
117. US Embassy Cables: Italy, the EU and the Anti-Counterfeit Trading Agreement, THE
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
22,
2010),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cablesdocuments/176810?CMP=twt_gu.
118. Kimberlee Weatherall, ACTA as a New Kind of International IP Lawmaking, 26 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 839, 880 (2011).
119. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 34, at 64.
120. Sell, supra note 10, at 4.
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getting local laws made stronger again . . . and then claims that the
international partners all have to boost the levels of protection again
to ‘harmonize’ things. What happens is you get an escalating system
where the laws keep getting more stringent as each side tries to
‘catch up’ with the other, while leapfrogging them each time they do.
This gets even worse, because whenever people talk of reducing
intellectual property protection, the same groups that lobbied for
stronger intellectual property laws then start saying that we could
never do that because it would violate these all important
121
international treaties . . .

Masnick’s lay summary of what is essentially the ratchet theory
illustrates two distinct advantages seized by maximalists: it allows
them to reframe the issue of IP harmonization to treat it as an almost
exclusively economic issue, then bind legislatures to increasingly high
predicate levels of harmonization, robbing them of their supervisory
functions. By shifting harmonization efforts from optional treaties like
the Paris and Berne Conventions to mandatory implementations such as
TRIPS, the construct itself becomes one of stringency rather than
respect for different cultures and property rights regimes. IP is moved
further away from nuance and closer to literality (i.e. treatment as actual
property). By helping to facilitate this shift, maximalists encourage
conflation of physical and intellectual property, equating copyright
infringement with physical counterfeiting, and thus birth the rhetorical
argument for extending harmonization of trademark protection (the
logical focus of ACTA)122 to cover copyrights and patents as well.
The elephant in the room concerning the aforementioned rhetoric
is, of course, that IP is a purely legal construct. The fundamental
purpose of property rights is to better manage the allocation of scarce
resources; those who have it may buy, sell, and exchange it as they
please, guided by principles of market efficiency.123 Intellectual
property, however, is an infinite resource, incapable of exhaustion—
hence why copyrights and patents are protected in the United States by

121. Mike Masnick, Big Content Goes Back to Sneaking Bad Rules in Through Treaties,
TECHDIRT (May 2, 2006, 12:28 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20060502/1217204.shtml.
122. “Counterfeiting” is defined by the U.S. Department of State as the “act of producing or
selling a product containing a sham mark that is an intentional and calculated reproduction of the
genuine mark,” otherwise known as providing a false source of origin for a good—a hallmark of
trademark law. See Glossary of Intellectual Property Terms, AMERICA.GOV (Apr. 29, 2008),
available at http://www.america.gov/st/econ-english/2008/April/20080429233718eaifas0.304306
7.html.
123. Stephan Kinsella, Against Intellectual Property, 15 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 1, 7–8
(2001), available at http://mises.org/journals/jls/15_2/15_2_1.pdf.
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the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause,124 while only trademarks
are protected under the Commerce Clause.125 This split between
trademark law and the rest of IP law is critical to understanding the
proper role of ACTA, and why its current form betrays its potential.
While no IP is capable of exhaustion, trademarks are capable of
inefficient allocation, and thus retain a modicum of similarity to actual
property.126 In this regard, consumers can and should be protected from
unscrupulous purveyors of counterfeit products when they market their
wares as those of another. If the purpose of ACTA is to prevent
counterfeiting by inferior producers, trademark law has a place within
it. However, no similar harm is caused to consumers when they
purchase pirated DVDs or medicines manufactured in violation of a
patent. Absent deception as to the origin of a product, the only
perceptible harm caused, if any, is to the holders of the copyright or
patent. Once this premise is accepted, ACTA is no longer a security
agreement, but a trade agreement in security’s clothing.
It is clear that copyrights and patents do not meet the same
criterion as trademarks when explaining what motivates the government
to grant exclusive controls over them to individuals. The purpose of
most IP, as spelled out in the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, is “To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts”127—in other words, IP rights are provided as an incentive to create
new works. The method of incentive is “by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries”128—an artificial monopoly on what is
otherwise capable of being infinitely reproduced. It is especially
important to take note of the particular locution of the Constitution: the
goal of the Intellectual Property Clause is to “promote the Progress.”129
The natural question is: who benefits from progress? And the natural
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
125. The
USPTO:
Who
We
Are,
U.S.
PAT.
&
TRADEMARK
OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/about/index.jsp (last visited Sept. 27, 2011) (“The USPTO registers
trademarks based on the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3).”).
126. The purpose of trademark law is to designate the source of goods or services in the
marketplace for consumer benefit; without efficient allocation (limited to the trademark holder’s
offerings), the mark loses its meaning. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S.
159, 163–64 (1995) ("[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying
mark, 'reduce[s] the customer's cost's of shopping and making purchasing decisions,' for it
quickly and easily assures a potential customer that . . . the item with this mark . . . is made by the
same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past.").
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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answer is the citizenry.130 Were the chief goal to benefit the creators of
IP, the clause would read along the lines of “to secure the Livelihood of
Authors and Inventors.” Instead, the goal of the clause’s grant is the
progress made, while the incentive (a temporary grant of artificial
monopolization) is merely a means to facilitate that progress.131
Even in this balance of rights and incentives, however, the history
of American jurisprudence has shown that a complete monopoly on the
works produced under the Intellectual Property Clause is intolerable.132
Products of the mind are subject to far greater philosophical and
utilitarian concerns than real property when it comes to abuse. This is
why so many protections are built into IP law for its various shades of
grey—what real property sees as trespass to chattels, intellectual
property may call fair use. This balancing act of rights and obligations,
integral to understanding what drives principled protection of IP, is at
the core of what ACTA threatens in the eyes of IP reformists. TRIPS
has already demonstrated how much easier it is to lock down IP’s
shades of grey when they are framed as impediments rather than safety
valves.133 ACTA, with its heated rhetoric on the threats posed by piracy
to both trade and security, seems well-poised to leapfrog it.
For the past twenty years, protection of IP has been in a perpetual
upward spiral, with slivers of anti-protection carved out to appease nonrights holders along the way.134 The outpouring of criticism concerning
ACTA (what Weatherall has characterized as a “collective, even ‘open
source’ analysis”135 by academics, pundits, and concerned citizens) is
evidence of widespread dissatisfaction with not only the character of the
130. See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.").
131. See, e.g., Berlin v. E.C. Pubs., 329 F.2d 541, 543–44 (2d Cir. 1964) (“[C]opyright protection
is designed ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ and the financial reward guaranteed
to the copyright holder is but an incident of this general objective, rather than an end in itself.”).

132. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(“The monopoly privileges [of intellectual property] that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a
means by which an important public purpose may be achieved.”).
133. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 35, art. 13; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (TRIPS
operates as a ceiling on fair use while almost everything else in the treaty acts as a floor for
protection. “Members shall confine limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights to certain
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holder.”).
134. For both national and international examples, see Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 512 (1998) (safe harbors provision); Berne Convention, supra note 25, art. 9(2) (threestep test for “fair use”); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 35.
135. Weatherall, supra note 118, at 840.
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global ratchet, but the direction in which it has been taking IP as a
whole. Maximalists may claim this perception is the result of an echo
chamber effect, amplifying what is, in reality, simply the cacophonous
drone of a handful of academics, likely infringers, and politicians
pandering to both. If true, the same maximalists should be pushing for
ACTA to go through a legislative vote as with any other IP treaty,
allowing Congress to vet the text and put faces and careers to its
approval or rejection. After all, if the voices of dissent are truly a
minority, then obtaining majority passage after a debate should not be a
difficult task. Were ACTA to be subjected to a legislative diagnosis,
however, maximalists would be deprived of their second major
advantage in utilizing the harmonization construct through ACTA (as
alluded to by Masnick): the ability to not only bypass the legislative
branch entirely, but permanently tie its hands on various issues by
unilaterally installing new glass floors on IP protection.136 This is one of
the most onerous possible outcomes of ACTA’s passage, and the
language allowing it to occur is already in place.137
IV. SECONDARY LIABILITY AND THE HARMONIZATION GLASS FLOOR
In October of 2010, a group of over seventy-five prominent law
professors released an open letter to President Obama, urging him to
“halt [his administration’s] public endorsement of ACTA and subject
the text to a meaningful participation process that can influence the
shape of the agreement going forward.”138 The letter warned that ACTA
“would establish new intellectual property rules and norms without
systematic inquiry into effects of such development on economic and
technical innovation in the United States or abroad. These norms
[would] affect virtually every American and should be the subject of
wide public debate.”139 More worrisome, the letter noted, was the
prospect that ACTA could unconstitutionally usurp congressional
authority:
The President may only make sole executive agreements that are
within his independent constitutional authority. The President has no
independent constitutional authority over intellectual property or
communications policy, the core subjects of ACTA. To the contrary,
the Constitution gives primary authority over these matters to

136.
137.
138.
139.

Masnick, supra note 121.
See infra Part IV.
PIJIP Letter, supra note 3.
Id.
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Congress, which is charged with making laws that regulate foreign
140
commerce and intellectual property.

It is for this very reason that members of Congress have voiced
serious concern with the ACTA drafting protocols,141 and is likely why
maximalists have supported those same protocols. The letter to Obama
critically notes that “[a]cademics and other neutral intellectual property
experts have not had time to sufficiently analyze the current text and are
unlikely to do so as long as there is no open public forum to submit such
analysis in a meaningful process.”142 In truth, many of ACTA’s
provisions are likely there precisely because the merits have been
contested in the past, and to the marked dissatisfaction of ACTA’s
primary beneficiaries.
Secondary liability, for example, is one of the most hotly debated
subjects in modern copyright law.143 Sometimes referred to as indirect,
contributory, or vicarious liability, it arises when a party is found to
have materially contributed to, facilitated, induced, or is otherwise
responsible for directly infringing acts carried out by another party.144
The basis for it in the United States stems from the common law of
agency145 and is entirely case-driven, as the Copyright Act contains no
explicit provision establishing liability for acts committed by a party
other than the direct infringer.146 One of the more recent developments
of the doctrine occurred in the 2005 case of MGM Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., where the United States Supreme Court held a popular
file sharing service that allowed users to trade copyrighted music files
was secondarily liable for inducing infringement of those songs from
said users:
[O]ne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative
steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
147
infringement by third parties.
140. Id. (internal citations omitted)
141. See supra Part II.
142. PIJIP Letter, supra note 3, at 3.
143. See, e.g., Matthew Helton, Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement: BitTorrent
as a Vehicle for Establishing a New Copyright Definition for Staple Articles of Commerce, 40
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 2 (2006–07).
144. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04
(2003).
145. See, e.g., M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412, 414 (E.D. Tenn. 1927).
146. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984). The
Supreme Court has itself noted, “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for
infringement committed by another.”
147. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005).
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At the same time that Grokster was being considered, a bill
proposing a statutory amendment similar to the Supreme Court’s
holding was introduced to Congress as “The Inducing Infringement of
Copyrights Act” (INDUCE).148 The bill sought to amend federal
copyright law to state: “Whoever intentionally induces any violation
[of copyright] shall be liable as an infringer.”149 The bill went on to
define “intentionally induces” as referring to anyone who “intentionally
aids, abets, induces, or procures, and intent may be shown by acts from
which a reasonable person would find intent to induce infringement
based upon all relevant information about such acts then reasonably
available to the actor, including whether the activity relies on
infringement for its commercial viability.”150
While the Grokster ruling and the INDUCE language are quite
similar, one glaring difference between the two is that INDUCE sought
to extend secondary liability to not only a party who “induces”
infringement, but who “aids” or “abets” infringement as well.151 This is
doctrinally problematic for a number of policy reasons: As law
professor Michael Carrier explains, aiding and abetting is a not a civil
standard, but a criminal one,
used to punish those who assisted in the crime. The getaway driver.
The fraudulent check presenter. The cocaine distributor. In the
criminal law arena, such liability reaches broadly to deter true
criminal conduct. In the context of secondary copyright liability, in
contrast, such a standard is not appropriate. Not when copyright is
subject to competing public policies. Not when technologies could
be held criminally liable for allowing search, performance, or
retrieval. Not when these monumentally significant issues—which
would dramatically expand U.S. liability—were never even
152
debated.

Perhaps it is for this very reason that INDUCE was never passed
by Congress153—they may have understood the prescience of allowing
the doctrine of vicarious liability in copyright law to be slowly shaped
and applied by the courts in response to a changing world, rather than
locking it into legislation in its most nascent form. Professor Carrier’s
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

CARE Act of 2003, S. 2560, 108th Cong. §1 et seq. (2003).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Michael A. Carrier, The Proposed New Copyright Crime of “Aiding and Abetting,”
OXFORD U. PRESS BLOG (Oct. 28, 2010, 2:30 PM), http://blog.oup.com/2010/10/copyrightcrime/.
153. Bill Summary & Status, S.2560, 108th Congress (2003–04) [hereinafter S.2560
Summary & Status], available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:s.02560:.
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words would certainly have been persuasive in the debate over
INDUCE’s passage, but alas, he did not write them in reference to
INDUCE; he was writing about ACTA.
Article 23.4 of ACTA requires signatory nations to “ensure that
criminal liability for aiding and abetting is available,”154 applying it to
“willful” infringement on a “commercial scale” (which is defined as
“commercial activities for direct or indirect economic or commercial
advantage”).155 The totality of this article allows for a finding of
secondary liability if an entity “aids or abets” activity indicative of
“indirect” commercial advantage, folding in terminology that ACTA
representatives insisted would not be part of the agreement’s final
draft.156 Due to the nebulous definitions within ACTA and the shifting
liabilities involved, third party intermediaries such as internet service
providers may face a simple choice under the agreement: risk
prosecution for inadvertently “aiding or abetting” infringers, remove
their services from the market, or institute draconian procedures to
ensure that the first option can never come to manifest. The United
States’ preferred route was made clear by language formerly contained
in Section 3 of ACTA, which intimated that the only surefire way for a
service provider to receive “safe harbor” protections from potential
secondary liability would be by terminating the service of repeat
infringers.157 It should be noted that this provision surfaced after the
USTR claimed that the United States would not be pursuing a “three
strikes” approach to safe harbor protection, which “termination of
repeat infringers” is in all but strict numerics.158
Congress has good reason to be worried about a purported
executive agreement that skirts their approval while mandating legal
standards they themselves have rejected in legislative form (i.e.,
INDUCE), especially when the agreement’s subject matter is supposed

154. ACTA (May 2011 Draft), supra note 4, art. 23.4.
155. Id. art. 23.1.
156. Malini Aisola, ACTA Briefing by De Gucht in the European Parliament, KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY INT’L, (July 13, 2010, 12:45), http://www.keionline.org/node/886 (“In an exchange
with MEP Lambrinidis, De Gucht indicated that the definition of “commercial scale” would not
be in the final version of ACTA. In implementing ACTA, Member States would have to rely on
national laws and court rulings.”).
157. Michael Geist, ACTA Internet Chapter Leaks: Renegotiates WIPO, Sets 3 Strikes as
Model (Feb. 21, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4808/125/.
158. Sherwin Siy, U.S. Government Denies that ACTA Mandates Filtering or Three Strikes,
But Questions on Its Contents Remain, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 10, 2010, 10:02 AM),
http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/2893.
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to be within their exclusive purview.159 Even if ACTA is fully compliant
with existing U.S. law (the questionable go-to justification for treating it
as an executive agreement at all),160 it still abrogates Congress’s
authority on IP issues by only allowing them to push forth stronger
protections to avoid placing the United States in violation of its new
international obligations.161 This is a serious problem with ratcheting up
harmonization efforts within contentious pockets of law—signatory
nations may find themselves unable to properly address dynamic legal
issues that arguably call for laxer restrictions or new systems entirely.
V. INFIGHTING BEHIND ACTA
The preceding analysis is not something that has been lost on the
negotiating parties of ACTA—diplomatic cables from 2009 reveal
awareness that “the secrecy around the negotiations has led to that [sic]
the legitimacy of the whole process being questioned.”162 Outside the
negotiation rounds, the agreement has been repeatedly referred to by
countries within the WTO as a “TRIPS-plus” measure, with China and
Brazil reportedly worried that its passage would “constrain flexibilities
and undermine the balance of rights in the TRIPS Agreement.”163 The
USTR has danced around the issue by insisting that the plain language
of ACTA can be ignored or softened under the flexibility of Article
1.2.1, which advises that “[e]ach Party shall be free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement
within its own legal system and practice.”164 This claim is problematic
in two respects: First, it ignores the fact that Article 1.1 of TRIPS has
the same boilerplate language, and countries have been found liable
159. See generally Andrew Moshirnia, Let’s Make A Deal! Will ACTA Force an End to
Executive
Agreements?,
CITIZEN
MEDIA
L.
PROJECT
(Feb.
9.
2010),
http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2010/lets-make-deal-will-acta-force-end-executive-agreements.
160. ACTA: Meeting U.S. Objectives, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/september/acta-meeting-usobjectives.
161. Ooana A. Hathaway & Amy Kapzynski, Going It Alone: The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement as a Sole Executive Agreement, 15 AM. SOC. INT’L LAW INSIGHTS, Aug. 2011, at 2–3,
available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110824.pdf.
162. Viewing Cable 09STOCKHOLM736, Concerns About ACTA Negotiations and IPR
Update:
IPRED,
WIKILEAKS
(Nov.
24,
2009),
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/11/09STOCKHOLM736.html [hereinafter “Stockholm Cable”]
(Nov. 24, 2009 diplomatic cable VZCZCXRO7102 from the American Embassy in Stockholm to
Washington, D.C.).
163. William New, China, India to Raise Concerns at WTO About “TRIPS-plus” Measures,
ACTA, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 3, 2010), http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article17479.
164. James Love, USTR’s Implausible Claim That ACTA Article 1.2 Is An All Purpose
Loophole, and the Ramifications If True, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Oct. 22, 2010),
http://keionline.org/node/990 [hereinafter USTR’s Implausible Claim Art. 1.2 a Loophole].
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through the WTO dispute resolution process for failing their
responsibilities under TRIPS even after invoking 1.1 as an affirmative
defense.165 Second, if ACTA were truly so malleable, then it stands to
reason that its provisional history would not be so tumultuous, which
the record clearly establishes it was.
According to Weatherall, the story of ACTA has essentially been a
test case for the global ratchet theory of IP protection itself.166
Weatherall’s analysis begins with the premise that ACTA is essentially
a “TRIPS-plus agreement,”167 which, based on the ratchet theory, should
be lubricated by the many free-trade agreements between the involved
countries that have preceded it.168 Speaking to her own jurisdiction of
Australia, she states that “the AU.S.FTA bilateral agreement has been a
‘stepping stone’ in that it removed Australia as a potential opponent to
certain provisions” of ACTA,169 particularly those affecting copyright
law.170 The United States has been noted as a prolific negotiator of Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs) in recent years, having struck them with over
a dozen countries in the run-up to ACTA's negotiations171 in order to
raise their overall levels of IP protection.172 Yet despite this predicate
level of harmonization, many provisions of ACTA still required
extensive scaling back during the negotiation rounds:
The European Union, Japan and New Zealand—parties not already
bound by U.S. FTAs—all expressed doubt about the inclusion of
access controls and criminal penalties. The text publicly released in
April 2010 clearly demonstrates that these differences continued in
165. Id.
166. Weatherall, supra note 118, at 848 (“The negotiation of ACTA is an interesting case
study to test the assumption of inevitable one-way ‘ratcheting up’ of IP obligations and the role of
bilateral agreements in this process.”).
167. Id. at 850.
168. Id. at 10–11 (“What is more, it seems clear that the negotiating position of these FTAbound countries on controversial issues within the ACTA have been influenced by their FTAs.”).
169. Id. at 16.
170. Id. at 11 (“Pre-FTA Australia applied criminal penalties where infringement was related
to trade or commerce, and in non-commercial cases only where it could be shown that the
distribution of copies had a substantial prejudicial impact on the copyright owner. Post-FTA,
Australia also applies criminal law to non-commercial acts of copying that have such an impact:
thus extending the criminal law to prolific downloaders, for example, as well as people uploading
(and hence distributing).”).
171. Ralph Fischer, The Expansion of Intellectual Property Rights by International
Agreement: A Case Study Comparing Chile and Australia’s Bilateral FTA Negotiations With the
U.S., 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 129, 135 (2006).
172. Id. at 134–35 (“Since the signing of TRIPS, bilateral agreements have been the most
active international intellectual property forum . . . Most commentators believe that the less
developed countries agree to provide stronger IPRs, or TRIPS-plus, protections in exchange for
greater access to the developed country’s markets and investors.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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the Wellington round of negotiations, with square brackets
separating out any reference to access controls or criminal penalties.
The leaked text dated July 2010—after the round in Luzern,
Switzerland in June-July 2010—shows a further shift away from the
U.S.’s preferred model to a form of language that can accommodate
173
a range of anti-circumvention laws.

Amongst many other tweaks, the reference to criminal penalties
eventually disappeared from the text altogether, and language indicating
the overall scope of the laws was reduced.174 Based on these
concessions, Weatherall concludes that “we are not seeing
multilateralisation of the FTA standards nor are they the ‘starting point’
from which standards can only go up. In fact, at all times the standards
embodied in the ACTA draft have been considerably weaker than we
have seen in the U.S. FTAs or in U.S. or EU internal rules.”175
Essentially, while ACTA began with a far more ambitious agenda, the
ratchet appeared to collapse under its own weight.
While the preceding analysis may be touted as demonstrative of a
flaw in the ratchet theory, it may also be seen as a last gasp from the
core of the harmonization construct. The current crop of proposals
comprising ACTA is a patchwork of watered down provisions,
principally whatever was left after all proposals were bled and defanged
to satisfaction. On the one hand, this is a mixed victory for IP reformists
(for whatever consolation they may take from “two steps ratcheted, one
step scaled back”)—on the other hand, it is an abysmal failure to bring
the negotiating countries to a meaningful consensus on issues of IP
enforcement. It is reminiscent of the recent Information Society
Directive negotiated within Europe, which Weatherall notes “has not
led to good outcomes for user or, arguably, right holder interests”—
rather, it has simply led to Member States interpreting the Directive
according to their own traditions, “leading to a mosaic of different rules
across Europe.”176 In short, it has been antithetical to harmonization.
Similarly, the end result of ACTA’s negotiations has been a
document rife with nebulous language, as confirmed by the
Congressional Research Service (whose findings were initially
suppressed by the USTR,177 perhaps due to the fact that they arguably
173. Weatherall, supra note 118, at 862.
174. Id. at 865.
175. Id. at 870.
176. Id. at 881–82.
177. See generally James Love, KEI to Appeal USTR Rejection of FOIA of Congressional
Research Service (CRS) Study of ACTA, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Mar. 23, 2011, 2:42 PM),
http://keionline.org/node/1103 [hereinafter KEI Appeal FOIA on CRS Study].
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contradicted assurances that ACTA would not require changes to
domestic law).178 According to the report, “[d]epending on how broadly
or narrowly several passages from the ACTA draft text are interpreted,
it appears that certain provisions of federal intellectual property law
could be regarded as inconsistent with ACTA.”179 Even more troubling
is the fact that despite the existence of caveat clauses that allow
signatories to be flexible in their implementations of the agreement,
“Members of Congress might be reluctant to consider legislative
approaches that would alter federal law in a manner that might make the
United States in default of its ACTA obligations.”180 This allows ACTA
to potentially cripple legislative oversight of IP while also providing
little assurance that the agreement would result in any semblance of
uniform application; success in the latter realm will depend on both the
ACTA Committee’s ability to effectively sanction its members and
members’ ability to coerce non-members to join the agreement.
VI. ACTA’S MEMBERSHIP AND “HARMONIZING WITHOUT A CARROT”
While early literature released by negotiating parties emphasized
hopes that developing countries would eventually join ACTA,181 leaked
diplomatic cables clarified that ACTA was meant to be imposed on
developing countries after setting “high-standards . . . among a select
group of like-minded countries.”182 Furthermore, the goal of ACTA was
“not to negotiate the different interests of [those] like-minded
countries,”183 but to “solve” the problems of developing countries184
while not actually having them at the negotiating table. As a
consequence, ACTA reflects few of the most critical internal concerns
of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRIC countries), but rather
those of developed nations regarding those countries’ allegedly weak IP
regimes. The question then becomes how to entice such countries to
“aspire” to join such an asymmetrical and non-beneficial agreement.
178. James Love, US Congress Is Not Bound by ACTA, According to White House Answers
to Senate Finance on ACTA and TPP Negotiations, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Apr. 19,
2011), http://keionline.org/node/1115 [hereinafter White House: Congress Not Bound By ACTA].
179. Memorandum from Brian T. Yeh, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division, Cong.
Research Serv. to Sen. Ron Wyden (Oct. 29, 2010) (entitled Potential Implications for Federal
Law Raised by the October 2010 Draft of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA))
[hereinafter CRS Letter to Sen. Wyden], available at http://infojustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/05/CRS10292010.pdf.
180. Id.
181. Fact Sheet, supra note 71.
182. Tokyo Cable 1, supra note 14.
183. Tokyo Cable 2, supra note 15.
184. Id.
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As previously noted, ACTA’s provisions go far beyond what is
required by TRIPS185 while not embodying its balancing mechanisms.186
Developing countries have already expressed serious concerns with the
agreement’s procedural posture187 and will likely be even less receptive
to its substantive protectionism, which may impact their access to
knowledge, technology, and other valuable resources.188 For many such
countries, protecting IP simply is not a major priority when its primary
beneficiaries are a handful of industries in developed nations.189 TRIPS
was able to leverage IP protection onto developing nations by “dangling
a carrot” in front of them, so to speak—access to the WTO.190 The many
bilateral FTAs that the United States forged with other countries, while
setting precedent for IP ratcheting, presumably benefitted the domestic
economies of those countries as well. ACTA, meanwhile, seems to be
an agreement without a carrot. It simply exhorts nations to join the
collective and alter their domestic legislation to the benefit of IP right
holders and the detriment of many others.
There is always the possibility that the carrot, instead of being fed
to developing nations, will be used as a bludgeoning tool. The United
States has proven in the past that it is not beyond utilizing legislative
coercion to grease the wheels of trade negotiations,191 and more
frequently employs methods of “soft” coercion (such as its Special 301
Report)192 to call for greater IP enforcement in various nations (although
some have lambasted these methods as “petty” and “lacking reliable and

185. Oct. 2, 2010 ACTA Text, supra note 105.
186. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Uruguay Round, Annex 1C, arts. 7–
8, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter GATT Annex 1C], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf (covering technology transfer and laws to
promote public health/development and curtail IP abuse).
187. See supra Part II.
188. Peter Drahos, IP Word - Made by TNC Inc., in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 197, 198–202, 212 (Gaelle Krikorian and Amy Kapczynski eds.,
1972).
189. Ferris K. Nesheiwat, The Adoption of Intellectual Property Standards Beyond TRIPS - Is
It a Misguided Legal and Economic Obsession by Developing Countries?, 32 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 361, 394 (2010) (“[Developing] nations stand to benefit little from heightened
levels of TRIPS and TRIPS-plus intellectual property standards that protect content they neither
produce nor possess.”).
190. Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS in the WTO, supra note 36.
191. See supra Part I (discussing Section 301 of the Trade Act).
192. See, e.g., OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (Apr. 30,
2010)
[hereinafter
2010
SPECIAL
301
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1906 (an annual review of the global state of intellectual
property rights protection and enforcement conducted by the USTR which purports to identify
“the ongoing systemic IPR enforcement challenges in many countries around the world”).
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objective analysis”).193 The private sector has weighed in as well: A
consortium of entertainment trade groups have directly lobbied the
European Parliament to ratify ACTA as well, by urging that a delay in
doing so would “weaken the position of the EU vis-à-vis its
international trading partners.”194 Other groups have taken a less
threatening tone: the EU Council has championed ACTA as a
“balanced agreement” that “fully respects the rights of citizens and the
concerns of important stakeholders such as consumers, internet
providers and partners in developing countries.”195 In doing so, the
Council skirts concerns that accession would circumvent parliamentary
procedures for regulating criminal enforcement measures.196 The
European Commission has largely duplicated these positions, calling for
speedy ratification and reaffirming an allegedly unsullied acquis.197
Despite their best efforts, however, the ACTA lobby was unable to
make a perceptible dent in converting many non-believers; even
Mexico, whose negotiators stressed “their willingness to join
the . . . negotiations and push-back against Brazilian efforts to

193. Adam Smith, United States - Is the Special 301 Report Out of Date?, WORLD
TRADEMARK
REV.,
(Apr.
30,
2010),
http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/daily/detail.aspx?g=D58D7553-F36E-41BA-8E9C9AD6B8818326.
194. Letter from The Anti-Counterfeiting Group Campaigning Against the Trade in Fakes et
al., to Jerzy Buzek, President of the European Parliament (Apr. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Letter to
Jerzy Buzek], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/54799890/Acta-Lobby-Letter.
195. Commission Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement Between the European Union and its Member States, Australia,
Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Mexican States, the Kingdom of Morocco, New
Zealand, the Republic of Singapore, the Swiss Confederation and the United States of America, at
3, COM (2011) 380 final (June 28, 2003) [hereinafter E.U. Commission Proposal for Council
Decision on ACTA].
196.
Regarding the signature and conclusion of ACTA, the Commission has opted not to
propose that the European Union exercise its potential competence in the area of
criminal enforcement pursuant to Article 83(2) TFEU. The Commission considers this
appropriate because it has never been the intention, as regards the negotiation of ACTA
to modify the EU acquis or to harmonise EU legislation as regards criminal
enforcement of intellectual property rights.
Id. The wording of the Council looks only to the purported “intention” of ACTA without
considering whether or not such enforcement standards will nonetheless be impacted. See Oct. 2,
2010 ACTA Text, supra note 105.
197. A Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights Boosting Creativity and Innovation to
Provide Economic Growth, High Quality Jobs and First Class Products and Services in Europe,
at 20–21, COM (2011) 287 final (May 24, 2011) [hereinafter A Single Market for Intellectual
Property
Rights],
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/ipr_strategy/COM_2011_287_en.pdf.
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undermine IPR in international health organizations,”198 ultimately saw
its Senate come out against the agreement.199 A report commissioned by
members of the EU Parliament warned of potentially severe negative
impacts on public health as a result of ACTA’s patent provisions,200
simultaneously slamming the ACTA negotiators for having ignored
nine specific Parliamentary demands for transparency.201 Furthermore,
questions regarding the legality of the agreement continue to percolate
in the U.S. Congress202 and the EU203, with the American Society for
International Law warning that ACTA’s intent to avoid the need for
legislative ratification whenever possible “has consequences not only
for intellectual property law, but for any area in which an international
agreement may be concluded—which is to say, nearly any area of
law.”204
Clearly, the same concerns that plagued ACTA since its first draft
have not dissipated, and now that the dust has settled on the negotiation
rounds, there is no more room for hope that its flaws will ultimately end
up on the cutting room floor. By October of 2011, eight countries
officially acceded to ACTA,205 with notable holdouts from the initial
signing ceremony including the EU, Mexico, and Switzerland.206 While
initially entertained as merely indicative of a vetting period, it also gave
198. Viewing Cable 07MEXICO6229, Mexico IPR: 301 Update; International Posture; USG,
WIKILEAKS (Aug. 30, 2011), http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/12/07MEXICO6229.html
[hereinafter “Mexico Cable”] (Dec. 19, 2007 diplomatic cable VZCZCXRO6069 from the
American Embassy in Mexico City to Washington, D.C.).
199. Dictamen Con Punto De Acuerdo Por El Que Por El Que Se Exhorta Al Titular Del
Poder Ejecutivo Federal Para Que Instruya A Las Secratarías Y Dependencias Negociadoras
Del Acuerdo Comercial Anti Falsificación, A No Firmar Dicho Acuerdo [Decree Calling for the
Federal Executive Office to Instruct the Departments and Agencies Not to Sign the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement], GACEDA DE SENADO (June 22, 2011) [hereinafter Decree
Against
Signing
ACTA],
http://www.senado.gob.mx/index.php?ver=sp&mn=2&sm=2&id=9376&lg=61.
200. Sean Flynn, ACTA and Access to Medicines, PROGRAM ON INFORMATION JUSTICE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AM. UNIV. WASH. C. L., 6–8 (Sept. 2, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1980865.
201. Id. at 3–5.
202. Letter from Sen. Ron Wyden to President Barack Obama (Oct. 11, 2010), available at
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/99038329/Wyden-Letter-to-Obama-ACTA-Oct-2011.
203. European Parliament Legal Service Confirms: ACTA May Or May Not Be Legal, EDRIGRAM (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number9.20/acta-ep-legal-service-opinion.
204. Hathaway & Kapzynski, supra note 161.
205. Derek Abma, Canada Signs International Anti-Piracy Agreement, MONTREAL
GAZETTE, Oct. 1, 2011 (listing the signatories as including Canada, The United States, Australia,
Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, South Korea and Singapore).
206. EU Will Not Join Countries in Signing ACTA This Weekend, OUT-LAW.COM, Sept. 28,
2011, http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2011/september/eu-will-not-join-countries-in-signingacta-this-weekend/.
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those countries the ability to observe some telling statements from
ACTA’s “eager beavers:” Canada (whose Industry Minister said ACTA
will be “subservient” to domestic copyright law)207 and New Zealand
(who claimed “ACTA will not change existing standards”)208 both
admitted that they would have to change their domestic laws to be in
compliance with the agreement.209
Given Knowledge Ecology
International’s analysis demonstrating that the United States is also not
in compliance with ACTA in at least two key areas (injunctions and
damages),210 one can assume its unapologetic mea culpa is coming
shortly.
VII. LOOKING BEYOND ACTA AND BACK AGAIN
Despite the miasma of concern surrounding ACTA, IP maximalists
have continued to push forward. Soon after finalizing ACTA, the USTR
unveiled details of a new Asia-Pacific trade agreement known as the
211
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),
which Public Knowledge has
212
described as “ACTA the Sequel.”
Even before its text had been
drafted, right holders already began to push for it to leapfrog ACTA in
213
terms of IP protection, and the USTR has stated that its IP chapter is
214
intended to “harmonize IPR obligations strictly upwards.”
207. Canadian Copyright Law to Trump ACTA, Clement Says, CBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2009),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/2009/12/01/clement-copyright-acta-ndp.html.
208. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Frequently Asked Questions, New Zealand
Minister
of
Economic
Development,
http://www.med.govt.nz/business/intellectualproperty/intellectual-property-enforcement/anti-counterfeiting-trade-agreement/faqs/will-actachange-existing-standards-of-the-protection-for-international-intellectual-property-rights
(last
updated Sept. 15, 2011).
209. Abma, supra note 205 (“Fast’s office said the government still needs to create and pass
legislation to implement the anti-counterfeiting agreement in Canada.”); Stephen Bell, Law
Changes Required Before NZ Ratifies ACTA, COMPUTER WORLD (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://computerworld.co.nz/news.nsf/news/law-changes-required-before-nz-ratifies-acta.
210. James Love and Krista Cox, ACTA Is Not Consistent with US Laws on Injunctions and
Damages, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Sept. 30, 2011), http://keionline.org/node/1289.
211. Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/tpp
(last visited July 14, 2012).
212. Rashmi Rangnath, ACTA the Sequel: The Transpacific Partnership Agreement, PUB.
KNOWLEDGE (Jan. 4, 2011, 2:51 PM), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/acta-sequeltranspacific-partnership-agreemen.
213. Id. (“A paper prepared by the U.S. Business Coalition for TPP (reported to be drafted by
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufactures of America, the US Chamber of Commerce, and
the Motion Picture Association of America) and leaked on the Internet, indicates that right
holders are urging the USTR to include in TPP IP protections more extensive than those present
in ACTA.”).
214. James Love, Notes from Meeting with USTR on the TPP IPR Chapter, KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY INT’L (Dec. 13, 2010) [hereinafter Notes from Meeting with USTR],
http://keionline.org/node/1035.
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Furthermore, the negotiations of the TPP “[would] not involve any
commitments to sharing the text with the general public, even after it
has been given to all member countries in the negotiation and to
215
hundreds of corporate insiders on the USTR advisory board system.”
In fact, all TPP-related documents but the final consolidated text will be
kept secret for four years after the agreement comes into force or the
216
negotiations collapse. There are few conclusions to reach in light of
this information other than that the United States has largely shrugged
off the criticism concerning ACTA’s handling, as it seeks to leapfrog its
217
questionable conduct and content with its new trade agreement.
Elsewhere in the ratchet, however, cracks are forming. In 2011,
U.S. Representative Lamar Smith and U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy
introduced the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Preventing Real
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual
Property Act (PROTECT IP, or PIPA) to the House and Senate,
218
respectively. The bills were offered up with the stated goal of giving
both the U.S. government and private copyright holders new tools to
attack so-called "rogue websites dedicated to the sale of infringing or
219
counterfeit goods" —essentially domestic analogues to ACTA. The
220
two bills received widespread criticism from technology experts,
221
222
legal scholars, venture capitalists, and many others for their overly
215. Id.
216. Jane Kelsey, Trans-Pacific Partnership Papers Remain Secret for Four Years After
Deal, TPP WATCH (Oct. 16, 2011), http://tppwatch.org/2011/10/16/trans-pacific-partnershippapers-remain-secret-for-four-years-after-deal/.
217. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Public Interest Groups Speak Out About Next Week's Secret
Meeting In Hollywood To Negotiate TPP (Think International SOPA), TECHDIRT (Jan. 26, 2012,
11:00 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120126/03162017547/ (“Unlike ACTA, where at
least the negotiators would admit where and when negotiations were happening (though, not
always with much time for others to get there in time), the TPP negotiations are kept entirely in
the dark from the public.”).
218. Bill Summary & Status, H.R.3261, 112th Congress (2011–12), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:h.r.3261:; Bill Summary & Status, S.968, 112th Congress
(2011–12), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:s.968:.
219. Press Release, Leahy, Hatch, Grassley Unveil Targeted Bill to Counter Online Infringement
(May 12, 2011), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=a18ddcc48da6-4cb9-b46e-104c21537d50.
220. Paul
Vixie,
Refusing
REFUSED,
CIRCLEID
(Jan.
11,
2012),
http://www.circleid.com/posts/20120111_refusing_refused_for_sopa_pipa/.
221. Letter from Mark Lemley et al., Open Letter to the House of Representatives (Nov. 15, 2011)
and Letter from John R. Allison et al., Professors' Letter in Opposition to "Preventing Real Online
Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011" (PROTECT-IP Act of
2011, S. 968) (July 5, 2011), available at https://www.eff.org/document/law-professors-letter-sopa.
222. Greg Sandoval, VCs to Congress: Antipiracy Bill Will 'Chill' Tech Investment, CNET (June 24,
2011),
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224

broad language and potential chilling effects on both commerce
225
and free speech. The response from the bills' advocates was largely
dismissive, refusing to directly address the specific areas of concern
226
brought to their attention and (much as was seen with ACTA) treating
227
the protests as the actions of a vocal minority. Seeing no reason to
slow down, SOPA and PIPA's sponsors pushed forth in the legislative
228
process despite widespread pleas not to do so.
Finally, IP maximalists had overplayed their hand. Grassroots
protest efforts swelled, with major Internet players and their users
banding together for a trickle-up coordinated strike against what they
229
perceived as an attempt to censor the Internet itself. On January 18,
2012, hundreds of websites went "dark" to demonstrate the effect that
SOPA and PIPA would have on not just "rogue websites," but
230
legitimate web-based companies.
The protests dominated news
231
232
cycles, edifying millions on the dangers of the bills in question and
resulting in a deluge of communiqués to elected officials in Washington
233
D.C.. The results were palpable: according to ProPublica, the shift in

223. Julianne Pepitone, SOPA Explained: What It Is and Why It Matters, CNNMONEY (Jan. 20,
2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/17/technology/sopa_explained/index.htm.
224. Brett Greene, SOPA and PIPA Bills Threaten Job Creation and Innovation, HUFFINGTON
POST
(Jan.
13,
2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brett-greene/sopa-and-pipa-billsthrea_b_1204825.html.
225. See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, The "Stop Online Piracy Act" (SOPA) Violates the First Amendment
(2011), available at http://www.net-coalition.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/tribe-legis-memo-onSOPA-12-6-11-1.pdf; see also Rob Bluey, Morning Bell: The Unintended Consequences of Internet
Regulation, FOUNDRY (Dec. 28, 2011 : 9:58 AM), http://blog.heritage.org/2011/12/28/morning-bellthe-unintended-consequences-of-internet-regulation/.
226. Jonathan Strong, Online Piracy Measure Brings Out Hard Feelings, ROLL CALL (Jan. 2,
2012), www.rollcall.com/news/online_piracy_measure_brings_out_hard_feelings-211304-1.html.
227. Id.
228. Mike Masnick, Harry Reid Says He's Concerned PIPA Will Break the Internet, But We Must
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with
It,
Because
of
'Jobs',
TECHDIRT
(Jan.
16,
2012),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120116/02442717414/.
229. Grant Gross, Who Really Was Behind the SOPA Protests?, PCWORLD (Feb. 2, 2012),
available at http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/249270/who_really_was_behind_the_sopa
_protests.html.
230. Ryan Grim, SOPA Blackout Aims to Block Internet Censorship Bill, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan.
18,
2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/18/sopa-blackout-internetcensorship_n_1211905.html.
231. See Dominic Rushe & Ryan Devereaux, SOPA Blackout and Day of Action - As It Happened,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jan/18/sopa-blackout-day-ofaction-live.
232. Deborah Netburn, Wikipedia: SOPA Protest Led 8 Million to Look Up Reps in Congress, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 19, 2012), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2012/01/wikipedia-sopa-blackoutcongressional-representatives.html.
233. Josh Peterson, SOPA Protests Caused Panic, Crashed Government Websites, DAILY CALLER
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stated positions on SOPA and PIPA by members of Congress had gone
234
overnight from 80 for and 31 against to 65 for and 101 against, and
all then-four Republican candidates for the 2012 Presidential Election
235
had come out against the bills. Within two days of the protests, both
SOPA and PIPA were listed as indefinitely postponed—in a word,
236
dead.
While there is every chance that SOPA and PIPA will be revived
in the future and subjected to a paring-down process similar to ACTA,
IP maximalists must now contend not only with the classic entrenched
opposition to their efforts (academics and citizens' rights activists), but
also with a galvanized public that has finally awoken to the perceived
237
overreaches of industry lobbying—including ACTA.
Less than a
month after the SOPA protests, tens of thousands of EU citizens took to
the streets against ACTA (which had been signed by the EU in January
238
of 2012 ), sending a shockwave through the region that resulted in
multiple member countries withdrawing their support for the
239
agreement. Most striking were the statements made by Lithuanian
Justice Minister Remigijus Simasius, who expressed great skepticism
not only of ACTA, but the entire state of play in current IP law:
[O]ur life is more and more dependent on R&D, new inventions,
creativity. Existing IP protection system, however, is more about
protecting the IP protection industry than a protection of inventors
and authors. Current debate worldwide is a clear sign that we have to
240
re-evaluate the existing IP rights system.

Responding to this backlash, Karel De Gucht agreed to refer ACTA to
the European Court of Justice in order to determine whether or not the
234. Dan Nguyen, SOPA Opera Update: Opposition Surges, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 19, 2012),
http://www.propublica.org/nerds/item/sopa-opera-update.
235. See James Crugnale, GOP Candidates Roundly Condemn SOPA During Debate, MEDIAITE
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.mediaite.com/tv/gop-candidates-roundly-condemn-sopa-during-debate/.
236. Brendan Sasso, GOP chairman shelves Stop Online Piracy Act, THE HILL (Jan. 20, 2012),
http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/205345-gop-chairman-postpones-piracy-legislation.
237. Adam Clark Estes, SOPA Stopped for Now, Anti-Censorship Activists Turn to ACTA, THE
ATLANTIC WIRE (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2012/01/sopa-stoppednow-anti-censorship-activists-turn-acta/47892/.
238. Olivia Solon, The EU Signs up to ACTA, but French MEP Quits in Protest, WIRED UK (Jan.
26, 2012), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-01/26/eu-signs-up-to-acta.
239. Juliette Terzieff, ACTA Protests Take Europe by Storm, FUTURE500 (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.future500.org/blog/acta-protests-take-europe-by-storm/ (“Authorities in several countries—
including Germany, Latvia, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia—have now said they will delay
signing on to the treaty.”).
240. Stephan Kinsella, Lithuanian Minister of Justice Condemns ACTA and Calls for Reevaluation of IP, CENTER FOR STUDY OF INNOVATION FREEDOM (Feb. 10, 2012),
http://c4sif.org/2012/02/lithuanian-minister-of-justice-condemns-acta-and-calls-for-re-evaluation-of-ip/.
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agreement is compatible with "fundamental EU rights and freedoms."
Unfortunately for ACTA, the prospect of a judicial affirmation was not
enough to stem the tide of public mistrust that had been triggered; even
the EU Rapporteur on ACTA, David Martin, declined to wait for the
ECJ to chime in before announcing that he would recommend the
242
European Parliament reject the treaty, and EU Commissioner Neelie
Kroes plainly stated that “[w]e are now likely to be in a world without
243
SOPA and without ACTA.” In July of 2012, the European Parliament
made good on Kroes’ prediction by flatly rejecting ACTA, 478 votes to
39:
The majority in the European Parliament is of the opinion that
ACTA is a wrong solution, a sentiment shared by millions of
citizens. The majority in the European Parliament is of the opinion
that ACTA is too vague, leaving the room for abuses and raising
concern about its impact on consumers' privacy and civil liberties, on
244
innovation and the free flow of information.

Martin, who was charged with administering the vote, speculated
that its defeat was likely to be the global death knell for the treaty
(given that just the week prior, Australia had been vocally
245
contemplating withdrawal from ACTA). Critics of the treaty noted
that this combination of events could very well leave the agreement
with a dearth of signatory nations able to breathe life into it (as at least
246
six countries must accede for ACTA to take effect).
241. Catrin Turner, Commission Asks ECJ to Rule on ACTA Compatibility, OUT-LAW.COM (Feb.
23, 2012), http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2012/february/commission-asks-ecj-to-rule-on-actacompatibility/.
242. David Martin, Draft Recommendation on the Draft Council Decision on the Conclusion
of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member
States, Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Mexican States, the Kingdom
of Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic of Singapore, the Swiss Confederation and the United
States
of
America,
2011/0167(NLE),
(Dec.
4,
2012),
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/apr/ep-draft-acta-report.pdf.
243. Press Release, Neelie Kroes, Vice-President of the European Commission Responsible
For the Digital Agenda Internet Freedom Re:publica Conference "The European Public on the
Net"
(May
4,
2012),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/326&format=HTML&age
d=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
244. Press Release, ACTA Wrong Solution to Protect Intellectual Property, European
Parliament
(July
7,
2012),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thepresident/en/press/press_release_speeches/press_release/2012/2012-july/press_release-2012-july3.html.
245. Monika Ermert, European Parliament Rejection Puts ACTA Future in Doubt (July 4,
2012),
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Clearly, a divide has begun to appear between what proponents of
increased IP protection can craft and what they can deliver in practice.
Traditional lobbying efforts were not able to keep SOPA viable in the
face of massive public scrutiny, and ACTA's numerous procedural and
substantive deficits have provided similar fuel for activist fire. Already,
this opposition appears to be having an impact on the direction of future
legislation: in the wake of the EU protests, the Dutch government
indicated a desire to move in the opposite direction of ACTA by
247
providing greater exceptions to copyright law. It seems odd, then, that
in the face of one massive public defeat (SOPA) and staring down the
barrel of another (ACTA), the TPP negotiators have doubled down on
their clandestine methods while still managing to convey the appearance
248
(if not the actual presence) of impropriety. This suggests that, in the
eyes of developed nations, harmonization is still an entirely trade-driven
construct (initial leaks of the TPP's text appearing to confirm this),249
and perhaps that all ACTA needed to stave off criticism was a few more
rounds of small-scale FTAs to buttress the framework of a plurilateral
agreement. There is little to no concern for public welfare, legal nuance,
or basic comity; only industry and income. And perhaps that is why
early indications are that, despite best maximalist efforts, the TPP is
falling apart as well.250
In theory, ACTA could still come into force between the United States and a
number of smaller states. Ten states have been negotiating it, and six of those
need to ratify it to have it come into force. In theory, this could become a treaty
between the United States, Morocco, Mexico, New Zealand, Australia, and
Switzerland. (But wait, the Mexican Senate has already rejected ACTA. As has
Australia and Switzerland in practice. Oh well… a treaty between the United
States and Morocco, then, in the unlikely event that the United States will
actually and formally ratify it. You can see where this is going.) As described
before on TorrentFreak, without the support of the European Union, ACTA is
dead. Doesn’t exist.
Rick Falkvinge, Victory! ACTA Suffers Final Humiliating Defeat in European Parliament (July 4,
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(Oct.
22,
2011),
available
at
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VIII. CONCLUSION
As WIPO Director General Francis Gurry stated back in 2010,
ACTA is a sign of weakness in our current multilateral system of law.251
The urge to solve legitimate questions of IP protection through jarring
forum shifts and backroom deals may help to mitigate the usual
protracted nature of international diplomacy and negotiation, but does
nothing to service the goals of proper harmonization. In fact, by further
decentralizing the administration of international IP law and
undermining the efficacy of existing institutions, it degrades the very
system it purports to augment. Canadian law professor Michael Geist
made this very point while speaking before the European Parliament in
March of 2012:
All countries and stakeholders benefit from a well-functioning
international intellectual property governance model led by WIPO
and the WTO. Ratification of ACTA will undermine the authority of
those institutions, causing immeasurable harm to the development of
global IP norms. ACTA countries avoided WIPO due to gridlock
concerns, but ratifying ACTA would perversely increase the
likelihood of gridlock. For those countries participating in ACTA,
the successful completion of the plurilateral model will only increase
the incentives to by-pass WIPO as a forum for challenging, global
issues. For those countries outside of ACTA, the relevance of WIPO
will gradually diminish, as achieving consensus on their concerns
252
may prove increasingly difficult.

Because the shifts underpinning ACTA are motivated almost
exclusively by commercial entities’ wants, they lack any semblance of
nuance, preferring disingenuous caveat clauses and nebulous language
over legitimate and significant carve-outs, disenchanting both the public
at large and developing nations in particular. While the ratchet was a
viable (if somewhat unscrupulous) model for raising international
standards of IP protection within the GATT, ACTA lacks both the
procedural transparency and the substantive rewards that make
traditional trade agreements viable. This is beyond the basic fact that in
becoming a catch-all IP treaty, by dipping into areas of law where there
the agreement’s value] is a red flag danger signal. Beyond that it seems that the Malaysians are also
questioning whether any benefits they may be getting are worth the trouble of further liberalization of
their domestic economy. And just to put the icing on the cake, it is becoming ever clearer that the
Vietnamese, whose economy resembles that of China with large segments controlled by state owned
companies, are going to have great difficulty in actually meeting the high standards being proposed.”).
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Workshop on ACTA (Mar. 1, 2012), available at http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/6350/125/.
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is already substantial harmonization through other organizational
efforts, and by attempting to bypass all the proper channels for
international trade agreements, ACTA is trying to bite off more than a
backroom executive agreement can reasonably chew.
Given how nebulous and difficult to track ACTA has been over the
course of its life, and because of the incredible systemic tumult that has
been set in motion in the aftermath of the SOPA protests, it is difficult
to ascertain what the ultimate fate of the agreement will be. At time of
writing, it is set to remain open for signatures until May of 2013, two
years after its final release.253 Ideally, it will be rethought for lack of
willing signatories and the core text shifted to an organization such as
WIPO or the WTO, where it can be converted to proposals native to that
forum. At the very least, any further attempts to forge such agreements
should be subject to the highest level of transparency possible,
involving not just narrow “stakeholder consultations,” but true outreach
to the public at large. Then and only then will its substance have
procedural merit. There is simply no excuse for injecting yet another
layer of bureaucracy to the international IP framework when
bureaucracy is what has slowed down the ability of countries to adapt to
evolving IP issues in the first place. Validating the ACTA drafters’ shell
games can only set a bad precedent for harmonization efforts to come.

253. ACTA (May 2011 Draft), supra note 4, art. 39.

